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Union Obligations .To Disclose Information Under the
Duty of Fair Representation: A Survey
I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of individual rights has always been an impor-
tant focus in American law, and is reflected in the field of labor
regulation as well as other areas. In the early part of the Twentieth
century, recognizing the power of large corporate employers to ef-
fectively overwhelm the interests of individual employees, Con-
gress passed legislation which legitimatized and encouraged collec-
tive bargaining power between employers and their workers.1
While it appears that the collective bargaining system has to some
degree served this purpose, though, it also created a new threat to
individual rights: specifically, the potential for their abuse by pow-
erful labor organizations.
As the statutes which fostered the development of "big labor"
initially provideed few protections for individual employees from
the labor organizations which represented them,2 one of the earli-
est responses to this undesirable situation came from the United
States Supreme Court. In 1944, faced with several cases involving
blatant racial discrimination by unions against employees that
they were charged with representing, the Court created a duty
upon unions to fairly represent employees.' Since 1944, the federal
courts and the National Labor Relations Board have expanded the
1. The principal legislation referred to here is the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577
(1926)(Codified at 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et. seq. (1982)), which extended collective bargain-
ing rights to employees of railroads and similar common carriers; and the National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. Section 151 et. seq. (1982)), which
extended similar rights to most private sector employees and U. S. Postal Service workers.
In 1936, the Railway Labor Act was amended so as to expand its coverage to airline employ-
ees. See 44 U.S.C. Section 181 (1982).
2. In fact, the 1935 National labor Relations Act generally defined conduct by employ-
ers that would constitute unfair labor practices, but union unfair labor practices were not
created until the passage by Congress of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
3. See, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., et al., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), dis-
cussed infra at note 6; and accompanying text; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men & Enginemen et al., 323 U.S. 210 (1944), discussed infra at note 14 and accompanying
text; and Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U.S. 248 (1944), dis-
cussed infra at note 15 and accompanying text.
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scope of this duty beyond situations involving racial discrimina-
tion, and it has been held that the duty applies to union actions or
omissions connected with both the negotiation and administration
of collective bargaining agreements." However, the precise parame-
ters of the duty have not been definitively established."
In this comment, the duty of fair representation will be ex-
amined as the federal courts and the Board have applied it to re-
quire unions to disclose information to bargaining unit employees
whom they represent. Following a short discussion of the develop-
ment of the duty of fair representation in general, information dis-
closure cases will be presented according to the type of information
involved. Finally, the implications of the cases will be examined
and conclusions drawn as to the current state of the duty of fair
representation with respect to information disclosure by unions;
and what, if any, changes might be appropriate for the future.
II. BACKGROUND
The duty of fair representation was first articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. In Steele, a black locomotive fireman sued his union
in the Alabama state courts for entering into an agreement with
the railroad which ultimately would have had the effect of elimi-
nating blacks from the fireman craft. Under the Railway Labor
Act 7 the union was the exclusive bargaining representative of all
firemen employed by the railroad, although the union prohibited
blacks from membership in it.' The Supreme Court of Alabama
held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, arguing that
the Railway Labor Act gave the union authority to bargain on be-
half of the craft as a whole "without any legal obligation or duty to
protect the rights of minorities from discriminaton or unfair teat-
ment, however gross."" The United States Supreme Court rejected
this reasoning, analogizing the duty of a labor organization to the
persons whom it had the statutory authority to represent to the
duty that a legislature has "to give equal protection to the interest
4. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers et al. v. Foust, 442 US 42,
47 (1979).
5. For a survey of current issues in fair representation law, See T. Boyce & R. Turner,
Fair Representation, the N.L.R.B., and the Courts (2d ed. 1984).
6. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
7. Ch 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1962)(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. Section 151 (1982)).
8. 323 U.S. at 196.
9. Id. at 198.
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of those for whom it legislates."' The source of the union's duty
was the statute authorizing it to exclusively represent a bargaining
unit of employees, in this case the Railway Labor Act." On the
facts of the case, the Court held that the Act imposed on the union
a duty to act for the benefit of all unit members and "without hos-
tile discrimination against them." 2 While not precluding a bar-
gaining representative from entering into any labor agreement
which had adverse effects on some unit members, the Court con-
cluded that the union's racial discrimination against the plaintiff
and other blacks was "irrelevant and invidious," and therefore a
violation of the union's duty to "exercise fairly the power conferred
upon it" by the statute. 3
In cases decided on the same day as Steele-Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen " and Wallace Corp. v.
N.L.R.B.'5 the Supreme Court, respectively, held that the federal
courts had jurisdiction to entertain nondiversity actions under the
Railway Labor Act against bargaining representatives for failing to
represent employees due to their race; and that the National Labor
Relations Act,' 6 like the RLA, imposed upon certified bargaining
agents a duty to represent all employees "fairly and impartially.' 17
Eight year later, in Ford Motor Co v. Huffman,' 8 the Court elabo-
rated on Wallace in stating that the source of a union's duty to
fairly represent all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit de-
rived from Section 9(a) of the NLRA which gives unions selected
10. Id. at 202.
11. Id. at 204. The Court stated that "...the right asserted, which is derived from the
duty imposed by the statute on a bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from
the statute and the policy which it has adopted." Id.
12. Id. at 203.
13. Id.
14. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
15. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
16. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. Sections 151-168
(1982)).
17. In Wallace, the Court found that a company violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,
which prohibits discrimination against employees due to their union activities, where it ac-
quiesced to union demands for a closed shop agreement desired by the union to rid the
company of supporters of a rival union. While the Court cited no specific section of the Act
as giving rise to a fair representation duty, the Court stated that "the duties of a bargaining
agent selected under the terms of the Act extend beyond the mere representation of its own
group members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all
the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and im-
partially." Id. at 255.




under Board proceedings the authority to exclusively represent all
employees in a bargaining unit."9 The Court noted, though, as it
did in Steele, that provisions in a labor agreement that affected
some employees less favorably than others would not be found to
per se demonstrate unlawful actions by a union. A union was to be
accorded "a wide range of reasonableness. . . in serving the unit it
represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion."2
The Supreme Court expanded the duty of fair representation to
apply in situations beyond the negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements in Conley v. Gibson.21 In Conley, a group of black em-
ployees claimed that their union refused to invoke provisions in an
established labor agreement which would have protected them
from racially motivated discharges by their employer. The Court
rejected the union's contention that the employees failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, noting that collective
bargaining, to which the duty of fair representation applied, was a
continuing process which did not end with the successful negotia-
tion of a labor agreement. 22 Thus, a union's failure to properly re-
present employees in the handling of grievances was held to consti-
tute a violation of the duty of fair representation. 3
It was not until 1962, 18 years after the Wallace Court held that
the duty of fair representation was grounded in the NLRA, that
the National Labor Relations Board held in Miranda Fuel Com-
pany, Inc.24 that a violation of the duty of fair representation con-
stituted an unfair labor practice. After examining the Steel, Wal-
lace and Tunstall decisions, the Board concluded that Section 7 of
the NLRA2 5 gave employees "the right to be free from unfair or
19. Id. at 337. Section 9(a) of the Act reads as follows:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ...
Ch. 372, Stat. 449 (1935)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. Section 159(a)(1982).
20. Id. at 338.
21. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22. Id. at 46.
23. Id.
24. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir 1963).
25. Section 7 of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. Section 157 (1982) reads as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own chosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
Vol. 25:959
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irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining
agent in matters affecting their employment."26 Unions which af-
forded employees such treatment were held to be acting in viola-
tion of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) and the Act.27 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce Miranda, finding no
support in the legislative history of the Act for a duty of fair repre-
sentation connected with a union's obligation to bargain with the
employer, and arguing that violation of such a duty was to be en-
forced by the courts rather than the Board.28 Although the Su-
preme Court has never passed on the validity of the Miranda doc-
trine, a number of the circuit courts now adhere to the position
that a violation of the duty of fair representation constitutes an
unfair labor practice under the NLRA.2 e
There is little doubt that the most influential case governing the
duty of fair representation was the Supreme Court's 1967 decision
in Vaca v. Sipes. 30 Vaca involved a suit by an employee, Owens, in
the Missouri State courts in which he argued that he had been dis-
charged by his employer in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement, and that his union violated the duty of fair representa-
tion by refusing to arbitrate the employee's grievance protesting
his discharge. After the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a jury ver-
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 8(a)(3).
26. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
27. Id. Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. Sections 158(b)(1)(A) and 158(b)(2)
(1982) read, in pertinent parts, as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 . ..
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or termi-
nated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
28. 326 F.2d 172, 177-178 (1963).
29. Cases upholding the Miranda doctrine include Kesner v. N.L.R.B., 532 F.2d 1169
(7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 US. 983 and 429 U.S. 1022 (1976); Kling v. N.L.R.B., 503
F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1975); Bell & Howell Co. v. N.L.R.B., 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v. N.L.R.B., 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). Indeed, the Second Circuit itself
now adheres to Miranda, see N.L.R.B. v. Local 282, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 740 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1984). To date, though, the Supreme Court has declined to
accept or reject the doctrine. See DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 170 (1983).
30. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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dict in favor of the employee, the union appealed the decision, ar-
guing that its conduct, if improper, was an unfair labor practice
under Miranda, and therefore under the exclusive jurisdiciton of
the N.L.R.B.s1 The United States Supreme Court rejected the
union's claim, noting that the duty of fair representatnion had de-
veloped in the courts, and even assuming that breach of the duty
was an unfair labor practice,3n federal and state courts should re-
tain concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving the duty. 3 How-
ever, under the facts of the case, the Court found that the union
had not violated its duty in refusing to arbitrate Owen's griev-
ance.3 4 The Court stated that a breach of the duty occureed only
when a union's conduct toward a bargaining unit employee was
"arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith," and rejected the princi-
ple that every employee should have the right to have his griev-
ances arbitrated. 5 The Court finally rejected as inappropriate the
notion that a court or jury could find a violation of the duty of fair
representation based merely on its own opinion that a grievance
which a union failed to arbitrate was meritorious. Rather, the
Court held that the proper standard was limited to whether or not
the union made its decisions regarding the grievance honestly,
nonarbitrarily, and in good faith. As Owens failed to establish
that the union had hostility toward him, or had acted "other than
in good faith" toward him, the Court determined that the Union
had not breached its duty.3
Apart form its procedural implications, 8 Vaca articulated sev-
31. Id. at 176.
32. Id. at 186.
33. Id. at 187-188.
34. Id. at 195.
35. Id. at 190-193.
36. Id. at 193-195.
37. Id. at 194-195. The Court noted that the union had processsed Owens' grievance
through the first four steps of the grievance procedure, and refused to arbitrate it only after
further medical evidence sought by the union to refute the employer's claim that Owens was
not healthy enough to work turned out to be unfavorable. Id. at 194.
38. Besides rejecting pre-emption of fair representation cases and recognizing concur-
rent jurisdiction over suits involving the duty in the courts as well as the N.L.R.B., the Vaca
Court established the right of employees to file hybrid suits against employers and unions
for breach of collective bargaining agreements-violation of the duty of fair representation
under section 301 of the N.L.R.A. Id. at 186-188. This subject, including post-Vaca develop-
ments, is discussed in detail in Note, Evolving Standards For Duty of Fair Representation
Cases Under Section 301, 62 Denver University L.R. 627-652 (1985). The Vaca Court also
concluded that where a union was found to have breached its duty but the breach was
occasioned by the employer's violation of the labor contract, liability should be apportioned
between the employer and the union "according to the damage caused by the fault of each,"
964 Vol. 25:959
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eral important principles which underlie the duty of fair represen-
tation. The Vaca court observed that the duty arose from the de-
prival by an exclusive bargaining representative of the individual
employee's rights to bargain with his employer under a federal law
scheme which promoted collective bargaining as being in the na-
tional interest.39 The Court concluded that the exclusive represen-
tative could not base decisions on employee grievances on such fac-
tors as racial discrimination or personal hostility, nor could a union
"perfunctorily" process or "arbitrarily ignore" a meritorious griev-
ance. 0 On the other hand, the Court recognized that voluntary ad-
justment of contractual disputes by the parties to a labor agree-
ment was essential to the efficient functioning of the collective
bargaining system envisioned by Congress, and voluntary settle-
ment of grievances and other problems could be frustrated if a
union was obligated to arbitrate all grievances at the behest of in-
dividual grievants.4" The most obvious means utilized by the Court
to encourage free use of dispute resolution channels by unions was
its pronouncement in Vaca that a union did not violate the duty of
fair representation by settling a grievance short of arbitration.42
Union discretion was also encouraged, though, by the Vaca Court's
removal from courts and juries of any right to "second-guess" a
union's evaluation of the merits of a grievance in deciding a fair
representation case.43
Since Vaca, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the
duty of fair representation applies not only to particular situations
involving racially discriminatory contracts or improper handling of
grievances, but generally to union actions or omissions connected
with the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreement. 4" It has been suggested by one circuit court, and the
N.L.R.B., that the scope of the duty encompasses all union deal-
ings which "affect employment" of bargaining unit members. 5
386 U.S. at 197. While initially this resulted in employees bearing most of the cost of
backpay liability, union liability increased following the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen
v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212 (1983). See T. Boyce & R. Turner, Fair Repre-
sentation, The NLRB, and the Courts 10-13 (2d ed. 1984).
39. 386 U.S. at 182.
40. Id. at 190-191.
41. Id. at 191-192.
42. Id. at 192.
43. Id. at 192-193.
44. See IBEW v. Foust, supra at note 4.
45. See Al Mumford v. James M. Glover, 503 F.2d 878, 885, fn. 8 (5th Cir. 1974); Local
No. 324, Operating Engineers, 226 N.L.R.B. 587, 597 (1976); and notes 73 and 81, infra, and
accompanying text. But cf. N.L.R.B. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 299,
1987
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It has also been held, since Vaca, by the Board and a majority of
the circuit courts, that a union cannot violate the duty unless its
conduct has been shown to constitute "more than mere negli-
gence."'46 In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., the Sixth Circuit
held in 1975 that merely negligent handling of a grievance
breached the duty,4 7 but on remand" (and in subsequent cases)
the court reversed its field and returned to the standard doctrine
that something more than mere negligence was required. Finally,
one circuit, the Seventh, adheres to the position that even gross
negligence will not violate the duty, requiring some form of inten-
tional misconduct by a union toward unfair representation claim-
ants. 9 Whether the proper standard should be "something more
than mere negligence," negligence, or intentional misconduct has
been sharply disputed by legal commentators, and remains a field
open for argument in the absence of a ruling by the Supreme
Court of the question.50
II. UNION OBLIGATIONS TO NOTIFY OR DISCLOSE INFORMATION TO
BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES
Cases decided by the federal courts and the Board with respect
to union duties to provide information to employees have arisen
under a variety of factual settings. For purposes of simplification,
the following discussion has been broken down into six topic areas:
782 F.2d 46 (6th Cir. 1985), where it was held that the duty does not arise where a union's
actions or omissions affect all employees in a unit evenly.
46. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local 692, 209 N.L.R.B. 446 (1974); Condon v. Local 2944,
United Steelworkers of America, 683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1982); Bazarte v. United Transporta-
tion Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3rd Cir. 1970); Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270,
(7th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 668 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1982).
47. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
48. 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981).
49. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519 (7th Cir 1981). The Seventh Circuit
has based its standard on a belief that union discretion in making decisions concerning the
processing of grievances should be maximized, and judicial interference with such decisions
minimized. See Baker v. Amsted Industries, Inc. 656 F.2d 1245, (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 945 (1982).
50. Most commentators believe that the standard for a breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation should be less that intentional misconduct, but are in sharp dispute as to what
degree of negligence should be required to make union conduct actionable. For arguments
supporting a simple negligence standard, more stringent than the prevailing standard uti-
lized by the Board and the courts, see Note, Determining Standards for a Union's Duty of
Fair Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 634 (1980); and
Note, Can Negligent Representation Be Fair Representation? An Alternative Approach to
Gross Negligence Analysis, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 537 (1980). Arguments supporting a
gross negligence standard may be found in Gregory, A Call for Supreme Court Clarification
of the Union Duty of Fair Representation, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 45 (1984).
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information related to union security requirements; hiring hall and
job referral information; information connected with grievance
processing; information related to collective bargaining agreements
and contract modifications; and finally, information concerning in-
ternal union matters. Following a presentation of cases in each
topic area, an attempt will be made to summarize the thinking of
the Board and courts in each area, as well as briefly discuss unitary
or divergent trends. Conclusions concerning the duty to provide in-
formation under the duty of fair representation as whole will be
presented in the final section of this survey.
A. Information Connected with Union Security Requirements
An area in which the courts and the N.L.R.B. have consistently
found a union duty to provide bargaining unit members with infor-
mation is that concerning information about employee obligations
under union shop agreements.5" Under a union shop agreement in
a labor contract, a bargaining unit employee is required to main-
tain at least "financial" membership in the union which represents
the bargaining unit as a condition necessary for his continued em-
ployment by the employer. If the employee fails to pay union initi-
ation fees and dues, the union may lawfully request that the em-
ployer discharge the employee, and the employer is contractually
bound to honor the union's request.
5 2
Even prior to its first discussion of the duty of fair representa-
tion in Miranda,53 the Board held in Philadelphia Sheraton Cor-
poration5 4 that a union violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
51. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. International Woodworkers of America, 264 F.2d 649 (9th
Cir. 1959); International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. N.L.R.B., 307
F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1962) cert. denied 371 U.S. 936 (1962); Sheet Metal Workers, Local No.
355 v. N.L.R.B., 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983); Rocket & Guided Missile Lodge 946, IAM,
186 N.L.R.B. 561 (1970); Teamsters Local Union No. 13, 268 N.L.R.B. 930 (1984); Helms-
ley-Spear, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1985).
52. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act made union shops lawful. However, a union cannot re-
quire actual membership by an employee as a condition of continued employment, but only
that the employee tender to the union the normal initiation fees and dues. An employee who
satisfies these financial conditions of union membership cannot be discharged under the
union shop clause, even if he is not actually a member of the union. See 2 The Developing
Labor Law 1365-81 (C. Morris ed. 2d ed. 1983). Examples of cases upholding a union's right
to request that an employee be terminated for failure to pay union initiation fees or dues,
and the employer's right to terminate the employee based on that request include Big Riv-
ers Electric Corporation, 260 N.L.R.B. 329 (1982), and N.L.R.B. v. Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 458 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972).
53. See, supra note 24.
54. 136 N.L.R.B. 888 (1962).
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Act by unlawfully causing an employer to discharge two employees
for failing to obtain union membership and pay dues as required
by a union security agreement in the parties' contract.5 While not
disputing that they had not tendered union dues to the union prior
to the union requesting that they be discharged, the employees ar-
gued that they had attempted to become members and pay dues,
but had been frustrated in their efforts by the union. In finding a
violation of the Act by the union the Board noted that:
[Tlhe parties herein had ... a lawful union-security agreement, and pursu-
ant thereto could lawfully require Vasquez and McIlwain to tender the peri-
odic dues and fees uniformly imposed as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing membership, but for one fatal deficiency-at no time was either man
told the amount of his dues or when such payments were to be made6 7
The Board went on to state that a union was obligated to notify
employees as to what their membership obligations were, as non-
disclosure of these would be "grossly inequitable and contrary to
the spirit of the Act.
58
In a later case, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Ma-
chine Workers v. N.L.R.B., the District of Columbia Circuit elabo-
rated on the source of the union's duty to notify employees of their
obligations under union security agreements. 59 The court opined
that the Act imposed a standard of "fair dealing" upon unions in
transactions with employees that they represented, and that the
duty of fair dealing was akin to a fiduciary requirement arising out
of two factors: "the degree of dependence of the individual em-
ployee on the union," and "the comprehensive power vested in the
union with respect to an individual."' 0 Turning to the facts of the
case, the court observed that the individual employees were, in es-
sence, completely dependent upon the union to advise them of how
to protect their rights under the union security provision, and that
the union had the power to require their discharges upon failure to
meet their obligations. 1 Noting finally that a union was the
"agent" of employees that it represented, and under general
agency law should therefore be
subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give [its] principal information
55. Id. at 896.
56. Id. at 893-895.
57. Id. at 896.
58. Id.
59. 307 F.2d 679 (1962).
60. Id. at 683.
61. Id.
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which is relevant to affairs entrusted to [it] and which, as the agent has
notice, the principal would desire to have ...,12
the court concluded that that union had arbitrarily violated its
duty uner the Act by summarily rejecting offers of dues by employ-
ees without explaining what the employees were required to do to
fulfill their membership requirements. 3 While not specifically
describing the union's "fiduciary duty of fair dealing" to be an as-
pect of a union's duty of fair representation, the circuit court cited
a United States Supreme Court case, Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman," which arose under the duty of fair representation, for
the proposition that a union "is responsible to, and owes complete
loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents." 5
In cases decided since IUE, it has been established that a
union's duty to employees concerning their union security obliga-
tions requires the labor organization to inform delinquent employ-
ees of the precise amount of dues that they are in arrears for, the
method by which the dues obligation was calculated, and the con-
sequences of loss of membership, i.e., loss of employment." In H.C.
Macauley Foundry Co. v. N.L.R.B., a7 a union was found to have
violated its duty in this regard by sending an employee a letter
explaining that the union would demand his discharge if he did not
pay his back dues, where the letter failed to clearly specify the
deadline for receipt of the dues." It has also been established that
a union's breach of its responsibility for notifying employees of
their union security obligations need not rest on a finding that the
union had hostility or bad faith toward an employee.6
In examining cases involving an exclusive bargaining representa-
tive's duty to inform employees of their union security obligations,
it might be argued that this obligation arises independently of the
union's general duty to fairly represent employees. Indeed, it has
already been noted here that the first Board cases finding union
breaches of the duty to inform with respect to union shop obliga-
tions were decided prior to the Board's recognition of the duty of
fair representation. Moreover, cases decided by the Board and the
62. Id. citing Restatement (Second), Agency, Section 381 (1958).
63. 307 F.2d at 684.
64. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
65. Id. at 338.
66. See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 13, 268 N.L.R.B. at 931 (1984).
67. 553 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 1201.
69. See, e.g., Rocket and Guided Missile Lodge 946, 1AM, 186 N.L.R.B. at 562 (1970);
Granite Steel Company, 169 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1968).
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courts in the former area, even to the present day, tend in general
not to cite "duty of fair representation" cases as precedent."0 How-
ever, no cases appear to suggest that the two duties are not
branches of the same tree, and it seems clear that both duties stem
form a desire by the courts and the Board to impose a type of
fiduciary obligation upon unions in order to protect employees who
have surrendeed their individual rights to bargain on employment
matters with their employers. 1 If there is any difference in the du-
ties, it would appear to be one of degree rather than of kind, as
discharge under union security provisions presents the somewhat
unique situation of a union, rather than the employer, taking steps
to initiate an employee's discharge.
B. Hiring Hall and Job Referral Information
A second area in which it has generally been held that employees
are entitled to information from their exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative as part of the duty of fair representation arises where a
union operates an exclusive hiring hall. Under an exclusive hiring
hall system, a union essentially undertakes a normal task of an em-
ployer, the procurement of workers to perform jobs on an as-
needed basis for various employers. As the name of the arrange-
ment indicates, the union is given the exclusive power under the
collective bargaining agreement to provide employees for any em-
ployer covered by the agreement, and while employers are not obli-
gated to hire unsuitable employees referred to them by the union,
they generally must give the union a chance to refer suitable em-
ployees prior to hiring employees from outisde the hiring hall sys-
tem. Similarly, under en exclusive hiring hall system, an employee
must attempt to procure work with an employer covered by the
system through the union, and is not free to solicit his own work
with a covered employer whether or not he is a member of the
union operating the hiring hall. Hiring halls operate primarily in
the construciton and maritime industries, as in those businesses
employment of individuals with particular employers is often lim-
70. See cases cited at note 51, supra. But compare Communications Workers of
America and its Local 6402, (N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum), 120 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1985), in
which the Division of Advice of the N.L.R.B. General Counsel's office characterized the "fi-
duciary duty to inform an employee that union security provisions have not been properly
complied with" as part of a union's "general duty of fair representation. Id. at 1352.
71. Compare, e.g., the explanation of the source of the duty of fair representation in
Ford Motor Company v. Huffman, supra, with the origins of the union security notification
duty described in IUE Local 801 v. N.L.R.B., supra.
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ited to short-term jobs.7 2
The Board has consistently held that a union violates the duty
of fair representation if it operates an exclusive hiring hall to favor
job applicants who are union members over non-members.7 At
least one circuit court of appeals, the Eighth Circuit, also recog-
nizes discriminatory referral of employees by a union as a violation
of the duty.74 Furthermore, it has been held by the Board that if a
union refers applicants without employing objective standards, or
if it fails to refer according to the exact provisions of a contractu-
ally established system, the union has breached the duty of fair
representation. 5
With respect to a union's duty to provide information to em-
ployees or job applicants in connection with the operation of an
exclusive hiring hall, the seminal case is Local No. 324, Operating
Engineers.7 In Operating Engineers, Carlson, a member of the
union but a critic and political opponent of the union administra-
tion, requested that a union official tell him how many people were
ahead of him and behind him on a job referral list. He also asked
for the names, addresses and phone numbers of the persons on the
referral list. Carlson's reason for requesting this information was
his suspicion that the union was discriminating against him in
making job referrals, and that verbal information given to him by
the union might not be accurate. The union refused to provide the
requested information, justifying its refusal on a claim that job ap-
plicants did not want their phone numbers or other information
concerning them to be given out. In an opinion affirmed by a
Board majority," the Administrative Law Judge held that the
union's failure to provide referral information was arbitrary con-
duct prohibited under the duty of fair representation.78 The ALJ
traced the development of the duty through Steele, Miranda and
Vaca, and concluded first that to satisfy the duty of fair represen-
72. The foregoing information concerning exclusive hiring halls was derived from 2
The Developing Labor Law 1396-1403 (C. Morris ed. 2d ed. 1983).
73. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Local Union No. 154, 253
N.L.R.B. 747, 760 (1980); Local No. 324, Operating Engineers, 226 N.L.R.B. 587 (1977).
74. Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters District Council, 535 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1976), on
remand, 422 F.Supp. 204 (D. Neb. 1976), on further appeal, 560 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1977).
75. See Boilermakers, supra, at 760; Pacific Maritime Associations, 209 N.L.R.B. 519
(1974).
76. 226 N.L.R.B. 587 (1976).
77. Member Fanning dissented, arguing that the union's refusal to provide the re-
quested information was, at most "mere negligence or lack of responsiveness" not proscribed
under the duty of fair representation. Id. at 588-589.
78. Id. at 598.
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tation it was not sufficient for a union to treat an individual or
group of employees the same as any other employees in the unit."'
Rather, beyond providing "equal protection" to employees, a union
was also required to "provide substantive and procedural due pro-
cess in taking action or refraining therefrom."80 The ALJ then ob-
served that while the refusal to provide information itself did not
directly impact upon Carlson's employment, Carlson's efforts to
ensure that his rights to referral under the contract were not being
violated was a matter which affected his employment, and thus
convered under the duty of fair representaiton.81 The ALJ finally
rejected as illegitimate the union's claim that it had refused to pro-
vide the information due to privacy concerns of job applicants, and
concluded that the union had proffered "no arguably reasonable
basis" for refusing to supply the information. 81 Under those cir-
cumstances, the ALJ considered the union's failure to provide the
information to be arbitrary, and therefore in breach of the duty of
fair representation."3
In cases decided since Operating Engineers, the Board has con-
tinued to hold that a union violates the duty of fair representation
by not acceding to the requests of job applicants for information
concerning referral rules and procedures and their own positions
on job referral lists. 4 The information obligation has not been
79. The ALJ noted that as the union apparently would deny the requested informa-
tion to any job applicant, there was no question of "differences in treatment" or "discrimi-
nation." Id. at 596.
80. Id. at 597. The ALJ cited Al Mumford v. James M. Glover, 503 F.2d 878, 885, fn. 8
(5th Cir. 1974)(union's renegotiation of pension plan contrary to the desires of majority of
represented employees could violate duty of fair representation) as standing for the proposi-
tion that discrimination against a minority or individual was not an essential element of the
duty. The AU went on to assert that claims could arise under the duty in such hypothetical
situations as that of a union ceasing to process any grievances from a bargaining unit, or
where a union negotiated an unsatisfactory contract in return for money paid by a company
to union officers. 226 N.L.R.B. at 597.
81. 226 N.L.R.B. at 597. The ALJ cited Mumford, supra, as defining the scope of the
duty of fair representation as applying to all matters "affecting employment." He went on to
note that in Mumford, supra, the Fifth Circuit had gone so far as to say that the duty of fair
representation was applicable to "all union dealings" based on Congress' grant to unions
under the NLRA of exclusive bargaining authority exercisable on behalf of all members of a
bargaining unit. 226 NLRB at 597.
82. Id. at 598.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Local 282, Teamsters, 280 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1986)(violation where union
refused to allow employees to inspect job referral cards and referral list); Iron Workers,
Local No. 433, 266 N.L.R.B. 154, 161-162 (1981) (refusal to allow employee to inspect dis-
patch book a violation); and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Local Union No.
154, supra, at 763 (violation where union refused to provide applicant with list of job refer-
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found to be satisfied by a monthly posting by the union of a refer-
ral list, where referrals are made on a more frequent basis.8 5 The
Board has found, though, that access to referral records may legiti-
mately be limited if the records contain confidential information or
are unduly burdensome for the union to produce.8"
In addition to providing requested information aboutr referral
rules and the referral positions of job applicants, unions operating
exclusive hiring halls appear to have an affirmative duty, as part of
the duty of fair representation, to notify hiring hall registrants of
any changes in hiring hall procedures which could impact upon
their employment. In Operating Engineers Local 406 v. N.L.R.B.,
87
the Fifth Circuit found a union to have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act by changing a rule eliminating registrants from the re-
ferral list if they accepted a job lasting more than five days, with-
out giving prior notification to job applicants. By "covertly" chang-
ing the rule, the union allowed several employees to retain places
on the referral list despite working six day jobs, which inhibited
employment opportunities for other employees.8 8 The court rea-
soned that the failure to notify all employees of the rule change
was arbitrary, as the covert rule change represented the operation
of the hiring hall without reference to objective criteria.8 9 Like the
Fifth Circuit, the Board has consistently held that the duty of fair
representation requires unions operating exclusive hiring halls to
give notice to job applicants prior to modifying referral system
rules.90
It is finally important to note that a finding of a violation of the
duty of fair representation with respect to a union refusing to pro-
vide information related to an exclusive hiring hall is not depen-
dent upon there being evidence of an intent by the union to dis-
rals made in specified time period, names of applicants referred and the employers referred
to, and the basis for each referral).
85. See Local 282, Teamsters, supra, slip. op. at 5-6.
86. See Bartenders and Beverage Dispensers' Union, Local 165, 261 N.L.R.B. 420, 423
(1982).
87. 701 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 507.
89. Id. at 510. See also cases cited in note 75, supra, and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g. Teamsters Local Union No. 519, 276 N.L.R.B. No. 94, slip. op. at pp. 7-13
(1985); Millwright and Machinery Erectors, Local Union 270, 276 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (1985)
(violation where union changed policy by initiating internal union charges against applicants
who refused referrals while working for non-union companies without announcing change in
advance to membership); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 11, 270 N.L.R.B. 424, 426 (1984)
(Union violated duty of fair representation by failing to announce 4000 hours of work re-
quired to be referred in group I to jobs, in advance of implementing rule).
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criminate against job applicants."
In explaining the broad scope of the disclosure duty with respect
to hiring hall information, and the affirmative nature of the duty
to notify job registrants of rule changes, the most important factor
is possibly the union's dual role in not only being responsible for
representing employees vis-a-vis employers, but also having the
sole power to initiate employment relationships of represented em-
ployees with employers. Consequently, arbitrary, hostile or bad
faith conduct by a union in this area, as in the area of unions de-
manding discharge of employees for not meeting union security re-
quirements, can directly impact the employment relationship with-
out prior action by the employer against the employee. Moreover,
as in the union security area, information vital to initiation or
maintenance of the employment relationship rests solely in the
hands of the union. It is not surprising, therefore, that the union's
duty to disclose hiring hall information is viewed in more strict
terms than it is in situations where the union does not have sole
custody of information, or where that information is not as vital to
the employment relationship.
C. Information Connected With Grievance Processing
The extent to which a union must disclose information concern-
ing its processing of employee grievances is less clearly delineated
than in the union security or job referral situations discussed
above. However, the Board and the courts have found failure to
disclose information concerning grievances to violate the duty of
fair representation in a number of instances, as the following dis-
cussion will illustrate.92
In Groves-Granite, A Joint Venture, the Board held that a
union's failure to tell an employee that it did not intend to process
a grievance over his discharge violated the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation. In this case, employee Baublitz was discharged for re-
fusing to work in the rain, and promptly reported the situation to
an official of the union which represented him. The union official
told Baublitz that he could not be terminated for refusing to work
in the rain, advised Baublitz to report to work the next day, and
indicated that the union would look into the matter the very next
day. After speaking with company officials, the union official de-
cided that he no longer wished to pursue Baublitz's claim, but he
91. See, e.g., Bartenders and Beverage Dispensers' Union, Local 165, supra, at 423.
92. 229 N.L.R.B. 56 (1977).
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declined to communicate this to Baublitz. Rather, he actually told
Baublitz, after his decision, that he would "see what we could
do."'93 The ALJ determined that by misleading Baublitz and
thereby "perhaps irreparably harming [his] ability to obtain re-
dress through alternate channels," the union violated its duty of
fairly representing Baublitz9 4 The ALJ went on, though, to also
determine that the union violated the duty of fair representation
with respect to its decision to drop the grievance, inasmuch as the
decision appeared to be based on the irrelevant considerations that
Baublitz had previously filed internal union charges against the of-
ficer who decided to drop the grievance, and that the union consid-
ered Baublitz to be a troublemaker.
9 5
The Board found a similar breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion in Local 417, UAW, 96 where union officials repeatedly told a
grievant that they were processing her grievance and would arbi-
trate it if necessary as late as two months after the union had
stopped discussing the grievance with the employer. The ALJ, af-
firmed by the Board, noted that the Union's action prevented the
grievant, Houck, from presenting the grievance herself to company
officials.97 This was particularly significant because the company
had invited the union to discuss the grievance, but the union de-
clined to do so.98 Based on this fact, and the possibility that union
officials held animus toward Houck because a friend of hers had
filed racial discrimination claims against the union, the ALJ found
that the union failed to properly represent Houck both in its
processing of her grievance and its willfully misinforming her
about the status of the grievance. 9
On the other hand, where there is not evidence of misrepresenta-
tion concerning the status of a grievance, or evidence that the
union dropped a grievance based on bad faith or animus against
the grievant, it is not clear that a union violates the duty of fair
representation by failing to advise an employee concerning the sta-
tus of her grievance. In Office Employees Local 2,100 the Board
held that a union official's failure to advise employee Eichelberger
93. Id. at 63.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 63-64.
96. 245 N.L.R.B. 527 (1980).
97. Id. at 535.
98. Id.
99. Id.




that the union had decided not to file a grievance concerning, in
particular, a failure by the company to give her severance pay
upon her resignation, did not constitute a breach of the duty. The
Board distinguished the Groves-Granite and UAW cases as both
involving willful deception and elements of union hostility toward
the grievant, which were not present in Office Workers. According
to the Board, such factors, or others not present in this case, were
necessary to establish that the union's failure to inform Eichel-
berger of its decision was "more than mere negligence."101 Deter-
mining that only negligence was involved in the present case, the
Board dismissed Eichelberger's complaint. 102
In the recent case of Local 3036, New York City Taxi Drivers
Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO, though, the Board found a violation of the
duty of fair representation despite a lack of evidence of union hos-
tility or animus toward a grievant.'0 3 In this case, the union aban-
doned a grievance without notifying the grieving employee of its
action, and in fact continued to advise the employee that his griev-
ance was being handled. The Board viewed this misrepresentation
of the status of the grievance in connection with a total failure by
the union to attempt to explain why it dropped the grievance, as
an arbitrary action proscribed by the duty of fair representation.0 "
The Board distinguished Office Workers on the grounds that in
that case, the union had at least considered the grievant's claims
and determined that they lacked merit before dropping her
grievance."0 "
In comparison with the Board, there are some indications that
the federal courts take a more expansive view of a union's duty to
disclose grievance information. In Robinson v. Marsh Plating
Corp., a U.S. District Court denied a motion by a defendant union
for summary judgment on an employee claim that the union had
misinformed him by telling him that his grievance over his dis-
101. 268 N.L.R.B. at 1356.
102. The Board has held in Teamsters Local 692 (Great Western), 209 N.L.R.B. 446
(1974), that negligence, standing alone, was not arbitrary conduct which constituted a viola-
tion of the duty of fair representation. In Office Employees, two additional factors seemed
to mitigate against a finding of a violation: 1) that the union fully considered the facts un-
derlying the grievance and reasonably determined that it lacked merit; and 2) that, under
the contract, Eichelberger could have filed and processed a grievance without the necessity
of proceeding through the union. Thus, the Board noted, Eichelberger's own inaction as well
as the union's resulted in her losing right of recourse when the contractural time limits for
filing a grievance expired. Office Employees, supra, at 1355-1356.
103. 280 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (1986).
104. Id., slip. op. at p. 6.
105. Id., slip. op. at p. 7.
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charge was still pending when in fact it had been dropped by the
union and was subsequently time-barred by the contract. 08 The
grievant also alleged that the union misrepresented to him that the
decision to drop the grievance was supported by all three members
of a union committee, when in fact two of the members never
heard about the facts of the grievance and allegedly would have
supported processing it. Although the plaintiff failed to allege any
hostility toward him on the part of the union, the court held that
the duty of fair representation could be violated if the employee
proved his complaint, as under those circumstances the union's
conduct could be termed as arbitrary, discriminatory, or under-
taken in bad faith.
10 7
In Harrison v. United Transportation Union, the Fourth Circuit
similarly held that a defendant union breached a duty to advise a
grievant that it had dropped his grievance despite a lack of animus
toward the grievant by the union.] °8 Harrison involved a situation
where the union and the employer apparently agreed not to pursue
plaintiff Harrison's grievance over a suspension in return for the
employer settling a grievance involving another employee. Harri-
son contended that the union thereafter intentionally decided not
to advise him of the decision to drop his grievance until the time
limits for advancing the grievance to the next step of the grievance
procedure expired, while the union claimed that its failure to no-
tify Harrison of the decision was an "accidental oversight." ' 9 The
court determined that even if the union's decision not to advance
the grievance was made in good faith, the decision not to notify
Harrison, found by the District Court below to be a conscious one,
was arbitrary, and therefore violative of the duty of fair represen-
tation.110 The arbitrariness of the decision was based on the fact
that the union's constitution and by-laws required the union to ad-
vise grievants like Harrison that it had decided not to advance
their grievances. " '
Perhaps the farthest extension to date by the courts of a union
duty to advise employees when it intends to drop their grievances
is found in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Robesky v. Quantas Em-
106. 443 F.Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
107. Id. at 815.
108. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
109. Id. at 560.
110. Id. at 561-562.
111. Id. at 560, 562.
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pire Airways Ltd. 12 In Robesky the union processed a discharge
grievance filed by employee Robesky through the pre-arbitration
steps of the grievance procedure, but the grievance was not arbi-
trated due to either late submission of the grievance for arbitration
under contractual time limits, or due to a union-employer decision
to settle the grievance on a compromise basis offering Robesky re-
instatement without lost pay. However, in offering Robesky the
settlement the union failed to advise her that it could not proceed
to arbitrate the grievance due to the expiration of time limits for
submission to arbitration, and Robesky rejected the settlement.
The employer subsequently withdrew the settlement offer and the
union advised Robesky that it was dropping her grievance. The cir-
cuit court vacated a judgment by the trial court and remanded the
case for consideration of two possible theories upon which union
liability under the duty of fair representation could be based. 3
Under the first theory, a factual finding that the union intention-
ally withheld information about its inability to arbitrate the griev-
ance could provide the basis for a finding that the withholding was
arbitrary because it lacked any rational basis.1 14 The court noted
that the information was critical to Robesky, and that while con-
cealing the inability to arbitrate from the employer might have
been rational, there was little risk in not concealing it from
Robesky herself.1" The court went on to conclude, though, that
even an unintentional withholding of the information could consti-
tute arbitrary conduct, if found to exhibit three elements: reckless
disregard of the grievant's interest, severe prejudice to her, and a
failure to serve the policies underlying the duty of fair
representantion.116 The court freely suggested that the first two el-
ements could be easily shown, as the union had ample opportuni-
ties to present the information to Robesky, and the consequences
of its not doing so was "the industrial equivalent of capital punish-
ment"-Robesky's discharge.' 17 With respect to the policies under-
lying the duty of fair representation, the court argued that the
principle policies favoring limits on liability-the needs of a union
to be able to screen out nonmeritorious grievances and to effi-
ciently allocate group resources-would not have been impaired by
112. 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978).
113. Id. at 1088.
114. Id. at 1089.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 1090.
117. Id. at 1090-1091.
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the union disclosing the information to Robesky.118
In summary, it appears that both the Board and the federal
courts would generally find a union to have violated the duty of
fair representation where a union misrepresents or intentionally
withholds information concerning the status of a grievance to a
bargaining unit employee. The foregoing discussion indicates that
this is particularly true where the union has dropped the grievance
based on bad faith considerations rather than an honest assess-
ment of its merits, and its failure or refusal to advise the employee
of the dropping of the grievance results in his being time-barred
from pursuing his own remedies with the employer. As a compari-
son between Office Workers and New York City Taxi Drivers indi-
cates, though, the Board may not find violations without an inten-
tional withholding or misrepresentation of information, and
perhaps evidence that the grievance involved is meritorious. Sim-
ple failure to inform may be found, as in Office Workers, to consti-
tute mere negligence, which is not sufficient in the Board's view to
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation.
The Harrison and Robesky cases, on the other hand, indicate
that the courts may view the duty more expansively. Harrison
clearly states that a breach of the duty may be found even if the
underlying grievance is dropped by the union for permissible good
faith reasons. The Fourth Circuit still intimates, though, that the
failure to inform was clearly more than negligence because it was
intentional. Robesky goes even farther, and is probably one of the
msot significant cases yet decided involving a union's duty to pro-
vide information. Under a Robesky analysis, neither bad faith, in-
tentional nondisclosure, nor misrepresentation would be necessary
elements of a violation of the duty of fair representation if the
union's failure was in reckless disregard of the grievant's interest,
severely impacted the employment relationship, and oculd not be
justified in terms of the union's need to screen out nonmeritorious
grievances or to efficiently allocate group resources.
D. Information Relevant to Contract Negotiations
A number of fair representation cases have arisen in recent years
contending that unions have breached their duties to bargaining
unit employees by failing to provide them with important informa-
tion about contract negotiations with employers. Often, these cases
involve misrepresentations or omissions by unions in explaining
118. Id. at 1091.
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contract proposals prior to submitting them to the employees for
ratification votes. Such cases also arise, though-and perhaps with
more serious implications-where unions are accused of misrepre-
sentations or omissions on negotiations matters which result in
strikes or even permanent loss of employee jobs.
A lead case in the area of a union's duty to provide contact rati-
fication information to employees is Anderson v. Paperworkers
Union.119 In Anderson, the Eighth Circuit concluded that misrep-
resentations made by a union to employees during contract negoti-
ations were a subject cognizable under the fair representation doc-
trine, rejecting a contention by the defendant union that the duty
applied only where the union was directly dealing with the em-
ployer.120 Turning to the facts of the case, though, the court held
that the employees' injury-loss of severance pay due to the em-
ployer's bankruptcy-was completely unrelated to union misrepre-
sentations before a ratification vote that the employer had agreed
to establish a special security fund to guarantee severance pay in
the event of bankruptcy. 2 ' Without such a link, the court con-
cluded, judgment for the union must result.
22
A similar result was obtained by the Ninth Circuit in the recent
case of Acri v. Machinists Lodge 115,23 where the defendant union
was accused of falsely telling employees that the employer had
agreed to remove limits on their severance pay, resulting in em-
ployees ratifying a contract to end a strike. Summary judgment
was granted for the union when the plaintiff conceded that it could
not prove that the employer would have agreed to remove the lim-
its had the contract not been ratified and the union continued to
strike to advance the severance pay demand.
24
When alleged misrepresentations by union officials lead not to
ratification of a contract but to strikes, the courts do not appear to
119. 641 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981).
120. Id. at 576. The union argued that its discussions with employees about what the
proposed contract contained were strictly an internal union matter. The court, citing Retana
v. Apartment, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union, Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972),
observed that so-called internal union matters often impacted on the relationships of bar-
gaining unit members with the employer. 641 F.2d at 576.
121. Id. at 580. The court posited that as the employer had consistently resisted the
idea of a special fund for severance pay, it was "mere conjecture" that the employees would
have been able to procure employer agreement to the fund - and thus avoid their later
injury - by refusing to ratify the contract and striking to obtain the fund. Id.
122. Id.
123. 781 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 332.
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have reached a consensus. In Swatts v. Steelworkers, 1 5 the plain-
tiff claimed that the union had induced employees to strike by
misleading them to believe that they could not be permanently re-
placed by the employer, and that they would receive more assis-
tance from the union's strike fund than they actually acquired. In
deciding the case in favor of the union, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois observed that it was not clear that
the union misrepresented facts so much as neglected to fully advise
the employees. 126 Nevertheless, the court also noted that the sub-
ject of whether or not an employer could permanently replace em-
ployees was a matter of law, and observed that general knowledge
of the law by citizens-and, of course, the employees involved in
the strike-could be presumed. 27 The above result is contrasted
with the holding of the Eighth Circuit in Chavez v. Food and Com-
mercial Workers, 12 1 where a verdict against the union was upheld
with respect to plaintiff employees who had voted to strike, relying
on union misrepresentation that they could not be permanently re-
placed if they went on strike.1 29 While observing that a union rep-
resentative could not be held to the standard of an attorney in
making statements concerning legal matters, the court noted that
his representations on such matters could still be actionable on a
less stringent standard. 30
Where a union has not misrepresented facts related to ratifica-
tion or the risks of a strike, the Board and the courts are more
reluctant to hold that there is a duty to inform. In western Confer-
ence of Teamsters,' the Board held that "failure to adequately
and fully explain the ramifications of. . . proposals" did not rise
to the level of intentionally misleading employees, and therefore
did not violate the union's duty of fair representation. 132 In a later
125. 585 F.Supp. 326 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
126. Id. at 332.
127. Id. at 333. In general, case law developed by the Board and the courts allows
employers to permanently replace economic strikers, but gives no right to permanently re-
place employees who strike to protest employer unfair labor practices. See Laidlaw Corp.,
171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enf'd. 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
128. 779 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir. 1985).
129. Id. at 1358-1359. It is important to note that the court denied recovery to em-
ployees who heard the misrepresentations but did not prove that they relied on them in
deciding to strike against the employer. Id.
130. Id. at 1358.
131. 251 N.L.R.B. 331 (1980).
132. Id. at 339. The ALJ cited Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO, Local 17, 241 N.L.R.B. 22, in which the Board implied that such
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case, Teamster, Local 912,133 the Board found no violation where
employees lost their jobs for violating a no-strike clause, and
claimed that the union had violated its obligations to them by not
advising them that they could lose their jobs for striking. The
Board concluded that as there was no evidence that the union "en-
couraged, prompted or misled the employees to strike," nor evi-
dence that it believed they were likely to strike, it could not be
concluded that the union's failure to inform was arbitrary or in
bad faith.134 Finally, in considering a question similar to that
before the Board in Teamsters Local 912, the Fourth Circuit held
in Self v. Teamsters, Local 61111 that a union did not violate the
duty of fair representation by not advising employees that a new
contract had been reached, where in the absence of such knowl-
edge certain employees struck and lost their jobs due to contract
provisions prohibiting unauthorized work stoppages. The court ob-
served that the employees were aware that unauthorized strikes
were prohibited, that the union had not authorized a strike, and
that the union had done nothing to instigate the strike.136 The
court dismissed as conjecture a claim that if properly informed by
the union of the status of negotiations, the employees would not
have struck and lost their jobs.137
In contrast to the above cases, failures to inform unit employees
without misrepresentation were found to violate the duty of fair
representation in Teamsters Warehouse Union, Local 860138 and
Parker v. Teamsters Local 413.1"9 In Teamsters 860, a group of
clerical employees lost their jobs after their union, at their insis-
tence, negotiated wage increases for them in a new contract. While
the employees admittedly pressed for the increases, they were
never informed by the union of the employer's negotiation position
that if the union obtained the increases, the employer intended to
close the entire clerical section. The Board found that the union's
failures to fully explain, absent bad faith, would be mere negligence not proscribed by prior
Board cases under the duty of fair representation. See 241 N.L.R.B. at 25.
133. 235 N.L.R.B. 200 (1978).
134. Id. at 202.
135. 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 443.
137. Id. The court essentially viewed the plaintiff's knowledge that unauthorized
strikes were prohibited as placing a burden on them to contact the union before striking,
rather than putting the onus on the union to advise employees that they should not strike.
Id.
138. 236 N.L.R.B. 844 (1978).
139. 501 F.Supp. 440 (S.D. Ohio, 1980).
982 Vol. 25:959
Union Duty to Disclose
failure to advise the employees of the risk to their jobs, regardless
of the motive for the failure, violated the union's "fiduciary duty"
to the employees. 40 In Parker, employees contended that their
union had violated the duty to faily represent them by not giving
them adequate notice of a ratification vote on an employer propo-
sal concerning flexible work hours. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that the union's conduct had been
arbitrary and therefore violated the duty."" Specifically, the Dis-
trict Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement clearly
made the union responsible for setting up the ratification vote,
that the issue was important to the employees, that the union had
had ample time to advise the employees of the election, and that
the union offered no explanation of its failure to notify some of the
employees about the election." 2 As a remedy, the union was or-
dered to conduct a second election, this time making sure that all
affected employees were adequately notified.
1 3
With respect to the contract negotiations cases, as in other areas,
it appears that the Board and the federal courts are more likely to
find a violation of the duty of fair representation where a union
gives misinformation than when it simply fails to provide any in-
formation at all. Even in the former situations, though, employees
seem to face the formidable obstacle of proving direct damages re-
sulting from the misrepresentations before they can recover. As a
practical matter, this will be extremely difficult, as it must gener-
ally be shown that employees would not have struck or ratified ab-
sent the misrepresentations; and further, in ratification cases, that
the employer would have granted an employee desired proposal
later had employees held out for the proposal rather than ratifying
a contract not including the proposal. Also, as the Swatts case in-
dicates, union misrepresentations on matters of law may be pre-
sumed by some courts to be immaterial because it is a legal pre-
sumption that employees are aware of what the law is.
The Western Conference of Teamsters, Teamsters Local 912,
and Self cases indicate that the Board and the courts are reluctant
to find violations where unions simply fail to inform employees
140. 236 N.L.R.B. at 851. The Union actually took the position that it did not commu-
nicate the information because it felt that the Employer's threats to close the section were
merely a bluff. Id. at 846.
141. 501 F.Supp at 449.
142. Id. at 448.
143. Id. at 451. The court observed that there was only a one-vote difference in the
initial vote, and that at least five eligible employees did not vote in the election. Id. at 448.
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about contract negotiation matters, as opposed to misrepresenting
the facts of the matters. However, the Board's decision in Team-
sters 860 indicates a possible exception to this rule where the
union is the sole source of information critical to the continued
employment of bargaining unit employees. Finally, the Parker de-
cision seems to represent the broadest conception of the disclosure
duty in this area, through its implication that the duty exists
where the union is solely responsible for arranging a vote on an
employment matter of importance to employees and has ample op-
portunity to convey the information to the employees, absent some
reasonable explanation of its failure to do so.
E. Information Relating to Collective Bargaining Agreements
and Contract Modifications
While traditional fair representation cases arise under the main
areas of contract negotiation and the handling of grievances, some
cases concerning a union's obligation to disclose information have
concerned subjects outside of these confines. One such issue dealt
with in recent years by the Board and the courts concerns whether
or not the duty of fair representation requires that employees be
given copies of collective bargaining agreements, or otherwise ad-
vised of contract obligations and changes which may occur in
them. Another is the question of whether or not a union must pro-
vide information which may assist employees in staying clear of
company discipline or discharge.
In Law Enforcement & Security Officers, Local 40B, 4 the Board
held that failure of a labor organizaiton to respond to a request by
an employee for a copy of the collective bargaining agreement cov-
ering the employee constituted a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. 145 The Board noted the fiduciary nature of the duty of
fair representation, and observed that failure of a union to provide
copies of collective bargining agreements impinged strongly upon
employees' abililties to ensure that they are receiving fair represen-
tation. 14 6 Under the facts of the case, the Board took cognizance of
the charging party's inability to understand his rights concerning
health and welfare claims he had made, due to the union's failure
144. 260 N.L.R.B. 419 (1982).
145. Id. The Board noted that such a failure also constitutes a violation of Sections
104 and 210 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 414
and 29 U.S.C. Section 440 (1982), but held that the remedy provided therein was not an
exclusive one. 260 N.L.R.B. at 419-420.
146. Id. at 420.
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to respond to his request for a copy of the health and welfare
agreement.
147
The Board seems to have limited the impact of this decision,
though, in a later case, Rainey Security Agency.' 48 In Rainey, em-
ployees attempting to deal with a union which had recently been
recognized as their exclusive bargaining representative not only
failed to receive copies of contracts after they had asked to see
such documents, but in many cases were unable to even contact
the union due to its failure to advise employees of its address,
meeting times, or to return employee phone calls. Nevertheless, the
Board maintained that the union's apparent "ineptitude or mis-
management" was not more than permissible negligence or poor
judgment, in light of an absence of animus toward the employees
or discriminatory treatment of them. 4 9 In distinguishing Security
Officers on its facts, the Board claimed one employee who had
agreed to act as an "information liaison" for the other Rainey em-
ployees had received a contract, and that the Rainey employees
requested contracts only for general purposes rather than to obtain
information about specific benefits. 50
A case decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1972, Retana v. Elevator
Operators Union,' 51 offers a special situation in which employees
appear to have been found to possess a right to receive copies of a
contract without requesting them to resolve a particular problem.
The Retana plaintiff alleged that her union violated the duty of
fair representation by failing to provide employees with a copy of
the collective bargaining agreement in Spanish (the language of
many of the unit employees), as well as by failures to provide as
bilingual liaison between the union and Spanish-speaking employ-
ees, and to explain employee rights and responsibilities as union
members-including the right to have their union process griev-
ances for them. Noting that the language barrier prevented Span-
ish-speaking employees from effectively participating in contract
negotiations or understanding their rights, the Court opined that
the union's failure to attempt to overcome that barrier might vio-
late its duty "to make an honest effort to serve the interests" of all
employees in its bargaining unit. 5 The court therefore denied the
147. Id.
148. 274 N.L.R.B. 269 (1985).
149 Id.
150. Id. at fn. 9.
151. 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972).
152. Id. at 1024, citing Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra.
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union's motion for summary judgment. Unlike the Board in its
later Rainey decision, the circuit court did not view it as important
that the Retana plaintiff did not raise her complaint with refer-
ence to rights or questions under any specific provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.1 53
Concerning the obligations of a union to advise employees of
contract modifications, the Board held in Teamsters Local 282154
that a union violated the duty of fair representation by failing to
advise laid off employees about an arbitration decision which, con-
trary to collective bargaining agreement provisions, held that em-
ployees had to "shape up ' 155 regularly to retain their seniority
rights. In Teamsters, the Board noted that the duty of fair repre-
sentation was not breached by mere negligence, and it failed to
find that the union was motivated by animus toward laid off em-
ployees or a desire to discriminate against them. 156 Moreover, it
was observed that the union did in fact announce the terms of the
arbitration award through stewards at a "shape up" meeting, a
procedure the union had normally utilized in the past to announce
arbitration decisions. However, the Board held the union's efforts
to be insufficient in view of repeated communications to the driv-
ers by the union prior to the arbitration decision to the effect that
they did not have to "shape up" to retain seniority rights, and
knowledge by the union that laid off drivers would not be present
(as they believed they were not required) at shape up meetings. 5"
In finding a violation, the Board held that a union could not pur-
posely keep employees uninformed as to matters affecting their
employment, and cited earlier cases which held that unions
breached the duty of fair representation by failing to inform em-
ployees of changes in job referral procedures. 158 In enforcing the
Board's decision, the Second Circuit, like the Board, held that it
was arbitrary for the union not to deviate form its "normal" an-
nouncing procedure, where it was aware that few if any laid off
drivers would be present at meetings where the award was an-
nounced. 59 The court further concluded that though the union's
153. Id. at 1023-1024.
154. 267 N.L.R.B. 1130 (1983), enforced sub nom N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters, Local 282,
740 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1984).
155. That is, report to a designated place for possible hire.
156. 267 N.L.R.B. at 1130.
157. Id. at 1131.
158. Id. Specifically cited were Local 392 Plumbers, 252 N.L.R.B. 417 (1980) and Op-
erating Engineers Local 406, see supra at note 87.
159. 740 F.2d at 147.
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conduct was unintentional, it was so far below minimum standards
of fairness and unjustified by legitimate union interests as to vio-
late "the fiduciary duty which a union owes to its members and
requires it to inform them of their obligations so that they may
take whatever steps are necessary to protect their interests in their
jobs.'
60
In two other recent cases, though, courts set limits to the doc-
trine that a union must advise employees of situations which could
negatively affect their job rights. In Jenkins v. Great Lakes Plas-
tics, 6' the U.S. District Court for the Easter District of Michigan
held that a union did not violate the duty of fair representation in
failing to advise an employee of the proper procedure for taking a
medical leave of absence. After the plaintiff had filed documents
that she had felt were sufficient to protect her job rights, her em-
ployer discharged her for failure to properly request a medical
leave of absence while off work for more than three days. The
plaintiff grieved her discharge, and the union arbitrated the griev-
ance, but the arbitrator sustained the discharge. The district court
refused to hold the union in violation of any duty to the plaintiff,
concluding that the union's failure to advise her of the proper pro-
cedure for requesting a medical leave was mere negligence.162 The
result in this case is not necessarily inconsistent with that of
Teamsters Local 282, though, as the medical leave procedure that
the employer demanded be followed was the same as that set forth
in the contract, which presumably the plaintiff had prior access
to. 163
In N.L.R.B. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local
299,164 the Sixth Circuit veiwed the information problem in an en-
tirely different context. In this case, an employer announced that it
intended to eliminate bid jobs for three employees. The union, up-
set at this, called a "meeting" on work time at the company's facil-
ity, despite the company advising the union that it considered such
a "meeting" to be an illegal work stoppage prohibited under the
collective bargaining agreement. The union never advised the em-
ployees of the company's contention or the possibility of discharge.
Subsequently, though, the employer issued 30 day suspensions to
160. Id.
161. 119 L.R.R.M. 2191 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
162. Id. at 2192. The report of the case fails to indicate whether the plaintiff asked the
union what the proper procedure was.
163. Id.
164. 782 F.2d 46 (6th Cir. 1986).
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58 employees who attended the meeting, and a joint grievance
committee later upheld the discipline because the union had never
taken steps to authorize a work stoppage. In ruling on charges filed
against the union by a disciplined employee, the Board held that
the union had violated the duty of fair representation by mislead-
ing employees to believe that they were merely attending a union
meeting, when the union knew that it was engaged in a work stop-
page.1 65 The Sixth Circuit did not dispute the Board's factual find-
ings, but refused to enforce the Board's decision as a matter of law.
The court held that the duty of fair representation only arose
when an individual or group of employees was treated differently
than some other individual or employee group.' e The court flatly
rejected the idea of "an undefined fiduciary duty which a union
owes to its unit as a whole" as an unwarranted expansion, making
the duty of fair representation a "catch-all" for "undesirable union
activity.' 6 7 The court contended that a breach of the duty of fair
representation could only be found when an individual or group
was treated differently than some other individual or group.16 8 As
this had not happened in Teamsters Local 299, the court refused
to enforce the Board's order.
In summary of the preceding cases, it can be seen that the Board
and the courts have often relied on small factual distinctions to
find no breach of the duty of fair representation in instances that
are very similar to others where no violations are found. The dis-
tinctions are not always convincing-for example, why should the
union in Rainey escape liability for not providing employees with
requested contracts, a violation in Security Officers, just because
the employees in the latter case were not interested in ascertaining
their rights in a particular contract area? Those employees, like
the employee in Security Officers, could well have been losing par-
ticular opportunities to recourse under their collective bargaining
165. 270 N.L.R.B. 1250 (1984). The Board also found that the Union had acted arbi-
trarily in never authorizing the work stoppage it had itself instigated, thereby subjecting the
employees to discipline which could not have been imposed for an authorized work stop-
page. Id. at 1251-1252.
166. 782 F.2d at 51-52. The court cited Vaca, supra, as quoted in DelCostello v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), as requiring only that in represent-
ing all its members, a union must not act with hostility toward any or discriminate among
them. 782 F.2d at 51.
167. Id. at 51.
168. Id. at 51-52. The court noted such cases as Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airlines,
Teamsters Local 282, and Retana, all supra, but concluded that in each there was some
individual or group that was found not to have been treated the same as other individuals or
groups. 782 F.2d at 51.
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agreement simply because they did not know the extent of their
rights. Retana seems to present a better reasoned decision-that a
union's knowing failure to provide employees with a way of effec-
tively understanding their contractual rights, whether with respect
to a particular problem or not, could constitute grounds for a find-
ing that the union has breached its duty of fair representation.
It is not so difficult to reconcile the outcomes of Jenkins and
Teamsters 282 concerning union obligations to advise employees of
particular contract provisions, but this reconciliation is most logi-
cal if focused on the fact that in Jenkins, the agrieved employee
had available an alternative source of the needed information-a
contract-while in Teamsters 282 the affected employees were ex-
clusively dependent upon the union to learn of their rights. Unfor-
tunately, the Teamsters 282 court attempted to justify its holding
on a purported showing that the union was "more than merely
negligent" in its actions. This is not convincing, where the union
was conceded not to have acted in bad faith, nor in a fashion dif-
ferent than the way it had acted in prior situations when arbitra-
tion awards issued. Rather than attempting to distort the facts of
Teamsters 282 to fit into a "more than negligence" category, the
Board and the enforcing Second Circuit could have reached the
same conclusion that the duty was breached on policy
grounds-specifically, that where a union is the only essential
source of information which could have a serious impact on unit
employees' jobs, fairness and the union's fiduciary-like role as em-
ployee representative demand that the union use reasonable, non-
negligent efforts to communicate the information to the employees.
The most disturbing case in this section is Teamsters 299, with
its holding that as a matter of law, no breach of the duty of fair
representation can occur unless an employee or group of employees
is treated differently than another group of employees. As noted
earlier in this survey, the Supreme Court has consistently main-
tained that the duty of fair representation is essentially a protec-
tion for employees extended in return for their surrendering the
right to bargain individually with their employer. It is difficult for
this author to see why a union's abuse of its bargaining authority
which affects all of the employees who have surrendered their indi-
vidual bargaining rights should not be protected by the duty of fair
representation, when it is clear that a similar abuse affecting only




F. Information Concerning Internal Union Matters
While, to some extent, ratification of a contract might be consid-
ered an internal union matter, it can be seen from the preceding
discussion that the Board and the courts have held that it touches
upon the employment relationship sufficiently to invoke some duty
of fair representation protections for unit employees. In cases in-
volving certain other situations generally considered to be internal
union matters, such as the right to resign from union membership
and eligibility to be elected as a union steward, the Board and a
federal district court have likewise held duty of fair representation
priciples to be applicable.
In Local 1384, Auto Workers,"6 9 a number of employees resigned
from their union during a strike via letters of resignation. The em-
ployees were all new union members, and not aware that the
union's constitution and bylaws placed certain procedural limits on
the rights of members to resign. Copies of these documents were
not available at the union office, though, and the union never noti-
fied any of the employees that it considered their resignations to
be invalid. Subsequently, over a year after the attempted resigna-
tions, the union contacted 28 employees who had attempted to re-
sign and advised them of back dues obligations. After most of the
employees refused to pay back dues, the union requested their dis-
charges under the union security provisions of the contract. In
holding that the union could not consider the resignations to be
invalid, the Board observed that the employees' weak and short-
term membership ties to the union, the union's failure to notify
the employees that there were limits on resignations, and its lack
of reasonable notice to the employees that it did not consider their
resignations to be effective lead to a necessary conclusion that the
union had breached "its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with
employees."17
0
In LaMarche v. Auto Workers Local 632,' the plaintiff argued
that a union had the obligation to advise him of his rights and
duties as a union member-specifically, with respect to rules con-
cerning eligibility for union office. Plaintiff, a laid-off employee,
was nominated to be a union steward, and received enough votes to
apparently win an election to that position. However, before he
could take the office another employee successfully challenged the
169. 227 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1977).
170. Id. at 1049.
171. 119 L.R.R.M. 3203 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
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election on the grounds that the plaintiff had filed to meet require-
ments of the union constitution and bylaws that he certify to the
union his eligibility, while not paying dues during his layoff, for
membership in good standing. As a result of not being able to hold
the steward office, the plaintiff lost the opportunity to return to
work from layoff by virtue of contractual superseniority provi-
sions.172 Because the impact of plaintiff's inability to hold office
based on his lack of information about union office requirements
had directly affected his employment, the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Michigan held that the claim was cogniza-
ble under the duty of fair representation. 17 Notwithstanding this,
though, the court held that in this case the duty had not been vio-
lated because the union had copies of its constitution and bylaws
available upon request, but the plaintiff had failed to request a
copy. 17 ' The court also rejected a claim by the plaintiff that laid off
employees had been mislead by the union to believe that they were
members in good standing when in fact they were not. While the
local union had been under the belief that plaintiff and others had
in fact been members in good standing, and communicated that
belief to the employees, the district court noted that the local's
belief was based on information from an International union offi-
cial, and that that interpretation had never been questioned by an-
yone until the plaintiff's election was challenged.17 5 Under these
circumstances, the court concluded that the union's ignorance of
the constitution and bylaw provisions was "based on misinforma-
tion and past practice and was not the type of arbitrariness which
reflects reckless disregard for the rights of the individual
employee."1
7 6
The above cases are primarily important because they illustrate
the potential scope of the duty of fair representation and the po-
tential for an infomation disclosure obligation on the part of a
union. Specifically, they indicate that where a union's action can
be shown to affect or potentially affect the employment relation-
ship of employees, a union will probably not be able to defeat a
172. Id. at 3209. Under superseniority provisions, employees who hold certain union
offices are constructively accorded by contract more seniority than any other unit employees
in areas that they represent to enable them to avoid layoffs and thereby remain available at
the workplace to handle problems of unit employees whom they are charged to represent.
See Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc. 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983).
173. 119 L.R.R.M. at 3209.
174. Id.




duty of fair representation claim on the grounds that the action
was related to an internal union concern rather than the collective
bargaining agreement with the employer. As with the cases involv-
ing contract information, though, the cases on internal union mat-
ters discussed above illustrate that a union can at least to some
extent immunize itself from liability by providing employees with
access to constitutions, bylaws and other documents which advise
employees of union rules, regulations and procedures.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The cases presented in the foregoing sections of this comment are
not entirely consistent with each other, a result which is not sur-
prising considering the unsettled nature of the duty of fair repre-
sentation in general. Nevertheless, it appears that certain general-
izations can be made which might assist efforts to determine
precisely when a union has an obligation to disclose information to
employees whom it represents.
First of all, it seems that no duty to disclose information will
arise unless a failure to disclose can be found to have adversely
affected the employment relationship, or at least to potentially
prejudice the relationship. Thus, duties to disclose have been al-
most universally found in the union security cases, where absent
being advised of what his financial obligations to a union are, an
employee can face discharge for nonpayment of those obligations.
Similarly, employees have been held to be entitled to extensive in-
formation concerning the operation by unions of exclusive hiring
halls, where without such information an employee could suffer
discrimination in employment opportunities virtually at the whim
of the union. On the other hand, duties to disclose have not been
found in cases where a failure to disclose has been viewed by the
court or the Board as not causing or potentially causing harm to
the employment relationship. One example of such a case is Office
Employees Local 2, where nondisclosure by a union of the fact that
it did not file a grievance for an employee made no difference be-
cause the would-be grievance lacked merit. The same reasoning
can be seen in the Anderson and Acri cases involving alleged mis-
representations by unions, where no violations were found because
the plaintiff employees were unable to show that proper union dis-
closures would have resulted in the employees avoiding harm
caused by their employers.
A second generalization indicated by the cases is that violations
of a duty to disclose are more likely to be found where the union is
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the only source from which the information can be obtained than
where the information is procurable from other sources. Again, it
seems that an important consideration in the consistent findings of
a disclosure requirement in union security and hiring hall cases is
the fact that in those situations, the union is the only possible
source of the vital information. The courts and the Board also
seem to be generally willing to hold the union responsible for dis-
closing information in situations where, apart from the union, the
information could only be obtained from the employer.117 This
may well be due to the traditional view that in collective bargain-
ing situations the interests of the employer and its employees are
adverse, and a resulting belief by the Board and the courts that
employees should not be compelled to seek information from an
adversary which they are not able to obtain from their purported
advocate, the union. However, where an employee or employee
group has access to desired information through sources other than
union officials or the employer, such as available collective bargain-
ing agreements or union constitutions and bylaws, the courts and
Board have often held union failures to disclose information not to
violate the duty of fair representation.
78
A third generalization that arises from the cases is that misrep-
resentations in disclosure are more likely to be found to breach the
duty of fair representation than simple nondisclosures. This is not
surprising, as misrepresentation is generally an affirmative and in-
tentional action cognizable under "bad faith" aspect of the duty of
fair representation. Conversely, to characterize a simple failure to
disclose information as a breach of the duty, the Board and the
courts have been faced with the task of finding the union's action
to be "something more than mere negligence," an undertaking that
has sometimes required the exercise of considerable ingenuity by
tribunals interested in obtaining just results.
17
9
With respect to misrepresentation cases, it further appears that
an employee must rely on the union's false statements in order for
them to be considered a breach of the duty of fair representation.
This element is illustrated clearly in Chavez, where employees who
177. See, e.g., Security Officers Local 40B, supra, and Teamsters Local 282, supra,
where union liability for disclosure was not absolved although the employers of the affected
employees were no doubt also in possession of the collective bargaining agreement and arbi-
tration award which were the subjects of these cases.
178. See, e.g., Lamarche, discussed supra at note 171 and accompanying text.
179. See Teamsters Local 282, discussed supra at note 154 and accompanying text, for
a good example of this problem.
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relied on union representations that they would be unfair labor
practice strikers in voting to strike their employer were found to
have fair representation actions against their union, while employ-
ees who stated that they would have supported a strike in any
event were barred from any possible recoveries."' °
Turning from these generalizations to policy considerations, it is
this author's belief that the duty of fair representation should con-
tinue to be applied to situations where unions fail to convey impor-
tant information which impacts upon the employment relationship
to employees, and even more certainly applied where misrepresen-
tations are involved. If anything, the courts and the Board should
be less hesitant to find violations of the duty in information cases
than in other situations where the duty is implicated. The chief
policy behind the duty of fair representation is to protect employ-
ees who have surrendered their individual rights to bargain with
their employers from abuse of their employment relationships by
actions of their exclusive bargaining representative, and it can
readily be seen that such abuses can occur as a result of unions
failing to properly provide information to bargaining unit employ-
ees. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Robesky, the
principal policy considerations that support limitations on the
duty of fair representation do not ordinarily apply to information
disclosure cases.1 s' More specifically, disclosure of information
would not generally force unions to expend collective resources in
pursuing frivolous negotiations goals or nonmeritorious grievances,
nor limit union discretion to act reasonably when faced with con-
flicting interests from different segments of a bargaining unit.
It might finally be argued that an expanded duty upon unions to
disclose information to employees would open the door to courts
and the Board imposing new affirmative duties upon unions not
contemplated by the Supreme Court, and in contravention of a
policy goal of limiting judicial and administrative interference with
the actions of unions.1"2 It has been argued that the duty of fair
representation is analogous to the duty of a legislator to his con-
stituents, and that in order to maximize the freedom of a union to
represent diverse employee interests, it is desirable to limit regula-
tion of most actions of union officials to exercise of the power of
employees to vote the officials into or out of office. 183 It has also
180. See note 129, supra, and accompanying text.
181. See note 112, supra, and accompanying text.
182. See Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at note 30, and accompanying text.
183. See N.L.R.B. Policy on Union's Duty of Fair Representation (N.L.R.B. General
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been pointed out that union officials generally lack extensive train-
ing in their representative functions, and it is therefore unfair and
unrealistic to judge their actions as one might be entitled to scruti-
nize and pass judgment upon the conduct of an attorney.184 In an-
swer to these arguments, though, it can be countered that the
Board and the courts have also analogized the duty of fair repre-
sentation as that of an agent to its principal, and have repeatedly
spoken of the duty as being fiduciary in nature or at least akin to a
fiduciary duty. If nothing else, fiduciary duties generally involve an
affirmative obligation of the fiduciary to truthfully disclose infor-
mation that is important to the party that it is acting on behalf of.
Finally, while this author would not advocate holding union offi-
cials to the standard of conduct expected of attorneys, it is submit-
ted that unions should be liable to a considerable degree for non-
disclosure or misrepresentation of information to employees whom
they represent. Holding union officials to a simple negligence stan-
dard in this area would not be inequitable. Unions should remain
free from liability where the information involved does not seri-
ously impact upon the employment relationship, or where it was
readily available to plaintiff employees from other sources, or
where employees did not act in reliance upon the misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure of the information. With these protections,
though, and considering the low costs of information disclosure to
unions in comparison to the potentially severe and even devastat-
ing costs to employees of nondisclosure, it not only seems fair, but
virtually required by the interests of justice that unions be legally
accountable for negligent nondisclosure or misrepresentation of in-
formation significantly related to the employment relationships of
employees.
Michael Eggert
Counsel Memorandum 79-55, July 9, 1979) as cited in Labor Relations Yearbook, 341-349
(Bureau of National Affairs, 1969). The purpose of this memorandum was to provide guid-
ance to N.L.R.B. field offices charged with investigating unfair labor practice charges impli-
cating the duty of fair representation. Id. at 349.
184. See, e.g., Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980), for a case
upholding this viewpoint. See also N.L.R.B. Policy on Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
supra, at 346.
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